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  Abstract 
Consumers are often uncertain about product quality and have to rely on different information, 
either given or pursued, to assess quality. Developing countries may lack institutional and technical 
resources to rigorously monitor and enforce product quality standards and/or to implement market-
based instruments where market failures are common. The information-based instruments on 
product quality may work well in these countries as they reduce information asymmetry between 
firms and consumers. This study investigates one particular information-based instrument, the 
National Inspection Exemption (NIE) system in China.  
China launched the National Inspection Exemption (NIE) System in various industries in 2000 to 
award firms who are in compliance with the quality standards, to inform consumers of product 
quality, and to lessen the pressure on regulatory monitoring and enforcement of product quality 
standards. Once a firm is granted the NIE title by China's National Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), its products are exempted from quality 
inspections by all governmental agencies at different levels for three years; but it is obligated to 
report the product quality condition to the local AQSIQ office annually. The NIE titled firms are 
also allowed to include the title in the product label and to use the status in the advertisement 
campaign.  
Based on the theoretical framework, we establish the hypothesis that consumers are more willing to 
buy the product with the NIE title and the NIE title is likely to increase sales revenue when 
consumers lack of means to assess quality. The empirical application of China dairy industry 
supports the theoretical hypothesis. In particular, using the firm-level panel data, we find that the 
NIE title boots sales revenue and the impact is both statistically and economically significant based 
on the difference-in-difference estimate and the random-fixed effect estimations. Furthermore, using 
the survey data collected right after the 2008 China milk scandal regarding the brand choice of infant 
formula among 1,228 mothers with infants and young children, we find that consumers’ preference 
for the NIE title still present even the NIE titled firms are involved in a food scare event. The 
positive NIE preference is particularly strong among highly educated consumers and those who buy 
domestic brands.  
 
Key words: brand choice, food safety, product quality, national inspection exemption, product 
quality standards 
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1. Introduction
Consumers are often uncertain about product quality before purchase, especially of experience
goods [Tirole, 1989]. They rely on different information, either given or pursued, to assess product
quality, including (a) advertising [Nelson, 1974, Noll, 2004] and strong brands [Chu and Chu,
1994, Aaker, 1994, Jin et al., 2008, Erdem et al., 2008]; (b) warranties promising to ﬁx or replace
a product if it fails to fulﬁll its performance claims within a given period [Courville and Hausman,
1979, Menezes and Currim, 1992, Noll, 2004]; (c) product demonstrations, such as test drives
and free sample for consumables, allowing buyers to test products directly without any obligation
[Smith and Swinyard, 1983, Heiman et al., 2001]; and (d) return policies such as replacements,
store credits, and money-back guarantees, which allow consumers to try products with a return
option [Chenokova, 2007]. These market strategies are ubiquitous in developed countries like the
U.S., but some of them are not necessarily offered in developing countries. On the other hand,
developing countries like China lack institutional and technical resources to rigorously monitor
and enforce product quality standards as the majority of the industry sectors are highly fragmented
due to emergence of many small, local companies. The same weaknesses limit regulator’s ability
to employ market-based instruments in countries where market failures are common and legal and
institutional supports for formal market activities are weak. Information-based instrument can
be effective in developing countries where strong regulatory institutions and/or well-development
markets are absent. The information-based instruments on product quality reduce information
∗Yanhong Jin is an assistant professor in Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics at Rutgers
University. E-mail:yjinaesop.rutgers.edu
†Liguo Lin and Lan Yao are assistant professors in the Economics Department at Shanghai Finance and Manage-
ment University, China.
1asymmetry between ﬁrms and consumers. This paper investigate one particular information-based
instrument, the National Inspection Exemption (NIE) system in China.
China launched the National Inspection Exemption (NIE) System in various industries in 2000
to award ﬁrms who are in compliance with the quality standards, to inform consumers of product
quality, and to lessen the pressure on regulatory monitoring and enforcement of product quality
standards. Once a ﬁrm is granted the NIE title by China’s National Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), for three years its products are exempted from
quality inspections by all governmental agencies at different levels, but it is required to report
the product quality to the local AQSIQ annually during the effective terms of the NIE title. The
NIE titled ﬁrms are also allowed to include the title in the product label and to use the status to
differentiate their product.
We investigate the NIE title from perspectives of ﬁrms and consumers by answering the follow-
ing two research questions: (a) Does and by how much the NIE title boost sales revenues? and (b)
Do consumers trust the NIE brands when the NIE titled ﬁrms are involved in a food scare event?
We choose the dairy industry for the empirical application mainly due to the rapid growth of dairy
consumption and ﬁerce market competition as well as a signiﬁcant food scare event occurred in
2008 in China’s dairy industry. The 2008 China milk scandal involved milk and infant formula
adulterated with melamine. The scandal caused signiﬁcant health and economic consequences. By
December 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Health reported that the toll of ill children was at least
22 million, more than 50,000 babies had been hospitalized, and six infants had died from kidney
diseases. The World Health Organization referred to this event as one of the largest [food safety
events] in recent year [WHO, 2008]. About 30 countries and regions banned, suspended or with-
drew imports of milk and milk products from China, including Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania,
Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam, Chile, India, and the European Union. Among 22 dairy ﬁrms
whose products were found to be contaminated with melamine, eight hold an effective NIE title.
Such food scare event provides an opportunity to examine whether the perception of the NIE title
changes among consumers. Our main ﬁnding is that the NIE title boosts sales revenue and con-
sumers have favorable perception of the NIE brands even when the NIE titled ﬁrms are involved in
the food scare event?.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the NIE system
in China. Based on the theoretical model presented in Section 3, we analyze the impact of the NIT
title on sales revenue and on consumers’ brand choice in Section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
22. Background of the NIE system
Many industry sectors in China, especially food, textile and building materials, are highly frag-
mented largely built upon a signiﬁcant number of small, local ﬁrms that are usually private and
family owned. Although in China there are a plenty of product quality regulations and some reg-
ulations are as strict as that in the western countries (e.g., the melamine standard is 1ppm for
baby formula in China and the U.S.), the enforcement of these regulations is very weak. It is
especially difﬁcult to monitor and enforce small and family ﬁrms to comply with quality regula-
tions/standards. It happens often that a small ﬁrm who is out of compliance is closed down by
regulatory agencies and reopened shortly after. As a result, there are many products in markets
that are not up to the legal quality standards. For instance, in 2001 AQSIQ tested a wide range of
food products and found that nearly 40% of foods made and sold in China were substandard, with
the worst problems found in canned fruit, dried ﬁsh and fruit drinks.1 Many of the food products
had been contaminated by toxins or bacteria, or failed to carry the required labeling information.
The situation is even worse in rural areas. For instance, 73.9% wheat powder was found being
substandard in the rural areas of Hebei province. 2 Moreover, according to a survey conducted
by the Ministry of Commerce in 2005, there were 43.7% rural consumers primarily emphasizing
cheap price in purchasing food, but only 8% urban consumers take cheap price into account in
food consumption, 3 which may lead to vast markets for the substandard in rural areas. As a conse-
quence, the substandard may drive out the qualiﬁed and it further causes further market distortion
[Akerlof, 1970]. Meanwhile, quality inspections had become serious entry barriers for potential
entrants in the late 1990s. For instance, AQSIQ at the provincial and local city levels often con-
ducted repeated quality examinations with respect to the products which intend to enter the local
markets. This brought entrants higher costs and therefore deterred their entries.
Early on December 5, 1999, the State Council issued a decision stating that “products with
stable, satisfactory quality can be rated as inspection-exemption products.” On March 14, 2000,
AQSIQ released the “Arrangement for Products Exempted from Quality Supervision and Inspec-
tion”, in which one critical criterion to receive the NIE title is to have stable, satisfactory quality
and having passed state or provincial-level inspections for three consecutive years. Following the
Arrangement, China launched the NIE System in 2000 to award ﬁrms who are in compliance with
the quality standards and to remove the entry barriers of repeated but not necessary product quality
1http://www.gov.cn/zxft/ft2/content 522913.htm. Last access on April 29th, 2011.
2http://www.hebgs.gov.cn/yw/yp/ygs bszn content.asp?ArticleID=2386. Last access on
April 29th, 2011.
3http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2005-11/17/content 100882.htm. Last access on April 29th, 2011.
3inspections. Once a ﬁrm is granted the NIE title, its products are exempted from quality inspec-
tions by all governmental agencies at different levels for three years, but it is obligated to report
the quality of its products to AQSIQ and provincial quality enforcement agency annually. The NIE
titled ﬁrms are also allowed to include the title in the product label and to use the status in the
advertisement campaign. The NIT titled ﬁrms can apply for the title again once its term of three
years expired.
Table 1 shows that the new NIE recipients had a signiﬁcant increase from a total of 178 in 2001
to 1,302 in 2007. At the beginning of 2008 a total of 4,232 ﬁrms in 290 industry sectors held the
NIE title. The NIE system is in fact a way through which the government provides inspection-
exempted ﬁrms quality guarantees. According to the survey on 2,152 inspection-exempted ﬁrms
conducted by AQSIQ in 2006, the market share of these ﬁrms increases 21% annually on aver-
age during the years 2002-2005, which implies that an NIE title can potentially increase demand
[AQSIQ, 2007].
Table 1: Number of new recipients of the NIE title (2000-2007) a









a Source: Data compiled based on the public announcement of ﬁrms receiving the NIE title issued by
AQSIQ (China’s National Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine), which
is available online at http://www.chinatt315.org.cn/mjzc/mjzc.asp. Last access on
April 8th, 2011.
3. The Model
We extend the framework presented in Shapiro [1983] to model the impact of the NIE title on prod-
uct price and consumer welfare. We assume an individual ﬁrm in a competitive market produces
one unit of product with quality q in each period at a cost of c(q). The cost function is convex with
4respect to quality q, i.e., c′′(q) > 0 and c′(q) > 0, c′(0) = 0; and it equals to zero at q = 0, i.e.,
c(0) = 0.
There is a rich literature investigating the impacts of imposing minimum quality standards and
howtosetthestandardsoptimally [Leland,1979,Shapiro,1983,Ronmen,1991,CrampesandHol-
lander,1995,Valletti,2000]. Leland[1979]pointsoutthataminimumstandardprotectsconsumers
from quacks, lemons and frauds. Shapiro [1983] argues that when consumers are heterogeneous
in their preference for quality, the optimal minimum quality standard is binding. That is, there are
some consumers who would consume a lower quality product were the standard lowered, while
others prefer high quality exceeding the standard. Ronmen [1991] and Crampes and Hollander
[1995] show that an intermediate minimum quality standard improves social welfare when ﬁrms
compete for prices. However, Valletti [2000] proves an intermediate minimum quality standard
unambiguously reduces total welfare when ﬁrms are quantity competitors. All these studies as-
sume the minimum quality standard is perfectly enforced. Our scenario is very different from the
ones in previous studies in that we allow for imperfect enforcement of legal standards and assume
that products with quality lower than the legal standards exist in markets. The consumers may
purchase those lower quality products due to budget constraints and uninformed quality informa-
tion. In China, the vast markets for the substandard are in rural areas (see discussion in Section 2).
Thus, we distinguish the minimum quality standard established by the government authority that
is denoted by q and the minimum acceptable quality level among consumers denoted by q0 such
that q0 < q.
Product prices that is denoted by p(Rt) solely depends on ﬁrms’ quality reputation R(t), but
each ﬁrm faces perfectly elastic demand at any given period and, thus, it is a price taker. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the expected penalties for producing substandard (namely, q < q) is
negligible either because of the slim chance of getting caught due to imperfect monitoring and
enforcement of quality standards, or because of a low amount of penalty if caught. Firms are as-
sumed to be risk-neutral and each ﬁrm chooses a sequence of quality levels over time to maximize
the expected present value of proﬁts.
The demand side is described by a set of heterogeneous consumers, who differ in their will-
ingness to pay for the product. A continuum of consumers is indexed by s, where s ∈ [0,S] and
S is ﬁnite. Let v(s,q) = s(q) be the value that consumer s places on quality q. We assume that a
consumer derives utility only from the ﬁrst unit he/she buys. The consumers’ value function used
is consistent with that in studies of quality differentiation [Shapiro, 1983, Ronmen, 1991]. The
surplus of consumer s who purchases quality q and pays p(q) is therefore s(q)−p(q). They choose
a quality q to maximize their surplus.
5Timing and reputation formation are the critical features of the model. We consider the case
of experience goods, namely consumers can only observe product quality after purchasing. The
“unknown” products are though to have minimum acceptable qualities when the NIE system is
absent. Therefore, regardless of the ﬁrms’ choice on actual quality their reputation among unin-
formed consumers is q0 in the ﬁrst period. After the ﬁrst period, reputation are updated according
to the actual quality level revealed after consumption experience in the ﬁrst period. Therefore, the





q0 if t = 1,
qt−1 if t ≥ 2.
(1)
Under the national inspection exemption system (NIE), product quality is ﬁrst inspected by
the government and according to which the ﬁrms those who produce qualiﬁed products (namely,
q ≥ q) are granted the NIE title. The NIE titled ﬁrms then obtain the reputation q, but the non-
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q for the NIE ﬁrms
q0 for non-NIE ﬁrms
for t = 1
= qt−1 for t = 2
(2)
Following Shapiro [1983] we then deﬁne the notation of equilibrium given the reputation dy-
namics in Equations (1) and (2). The equilibrium is a steady-state conﬁguration in which ﬁrms
maintain quality over time, and the price as a function of reputation schedule that is unchanging
over time. The conﬁguration in equilibrium rules out the situation in which ﬁrms enter and exit
market. Since q = R in equilibrium, the price schedule will be written as a function of quality
p(q). We formally deﬁne the following conditions for the equilibrium in the model:
(1) No-deviation condition: A ﬁrm with reputation q ﬁnds optimal to produce quality q rather
than to deviate.
(2) Market-clearing product quality:Markets clear at all quality levels q ≥ q0.
(3) Zero-proﬁt condition: No new entry is attractive as each ﬁrm earns a zero proﬁt.
(4) Consumer surplus maximization: Each consumer takes the price-quality schedule p(q) as
given and chooses the level of product quality to maximize his/her surpluses.
The lower and upper bound of the equilibrium price are given by the no-deviation condition and
the zero-proﬁt condition above.
6In the absent of the NIE system, the price of the minimum acceptable quality q0 is p(q0) =
c(q0). However, the price of the quality greater than q0 is composed of both costs and price pre-
mium. In the ﬁrst period, the quality greater than q0 are sold at the price of q0 that is lower than
its cost. The price premium in equilibrium just offset the “investment” in ﬁrst period. Thus, the
equilibrium price-quality schedule p(q) is
p(q) = c(q) + (c(q) − c(q0))r, (3)
where r is the interest rate.





c(q) + (c(q) − c(q0))r if q > q ≥ q0
c(q) + (c(q) − c(q))r if q ≥ q
(4)
The NIE system makes ﬁrms who produce products with the legal quality level invest less in
constructing their reputation and therefore require less price premium.
Figure 1 describes the price schedules with and without the NIE system. The horizontal axis
represents the quality level and the vertical axis represents price and/or cost. The cost function c(q)
is given by the dot upward curve that goes through the origin. The upward curve above c(q) is the
price schedule without the NIE system, which is continuous and monotonically increasing. The
dashed curve describes the price schedule with the NIE system that is discrete and not monotoni-
cally increasing. When q > q ≥ q0, the price schedule with and without the NIE system coincide.
When q ≥ q, the price schedule with the NIE system lies below that without the NIE system by
the difference (c(q) − c(q0))r.
Figure 1: Price schedule with and without the NIE system
We now consider the demand side of the market. Given the quality preference s, the value
function denoted by s(q) is simply a ray through the origin with slope s in Figure 1. The surplus is
7then the vertical distance between the value function and the price schedule. Consumers’ optimal
quality is then given by the q where the value function stay above the price schedule with greatest
vertical distance. For product without the NIE title, an individual consumer with quality preference
s ﬁnds optimal to buy a product with quality q0 and receives the greatest surplus of a in Figure 1.
However, with the NIE title she/he ﬁnds optimal to choose q where he/she gets surplus b that
is greater than a. Figure 1 suggests that the NIE decreases the demand for the substandard and
increase consumers’ welfare4. The theory thus predicts that consumers are more willing to buy the
product with the NIE title and likely to increase sales revenue.
4. Empirical Application of China Dairy Industry
4.1 China Dairy Industry
We choose the dairy industry, especially infant formula, for the empirical application mainly due to
the following three reasons. First, China has been experiencing a signiﬁcant increase in dairy con-
sumption in the last two decades. The Asian-Paciﬁc countries historically exhibit low consumption
of dairy products than the European and North American countries largely due to low lactose tol-
erance [Dong, 2005]. As shown in Table 2, the per capita consumption of all three main dairy
products, liquid milk, yogurt and milk powder, increased among urban residents in China from
1997 to 2008. For example, liquid milk was more than tripled from 5.07 kilogram per person in
1997 to 17.75 in 2007 among urban households. The 2007 consumption level was approximately
20% of that in the U.S. and European countries (83.00 and 89.50 kilogram per capita, respectively),
and only half as that in Japan (34.90 kilogram per capita). The consumption level is likely to be
even lower among rural households. The signiﬁcantly higher growth in the consumption of fresh
milk relative to milk powder may due to more convenience to consume fresh milk and the percep-
tion of milk powder being inferior to fresh milk among Chinese consumers [Fuller et al., 2004].
In general, high consumption of dairy products is associated with a high income as documented in
the literature [Bai et al., 2008, Zhou et al., 2002] as well as the data presented in Figure 2 among
urban households in China. Accompanied with signiﬁcant increases in dairy consumption, dairy
price in China has been increasing (see Table 2).
Second, the China dairy markets are indeed highly concentrated. As shown in Figure 3 , the
top three companies accounted for a signiﬁcant market share – approximately 60.42% for liquid
milk, 47.67% for yogurt, and 44.37% for milk powder. The top 10 companies in the each mar-
4Since ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium, consumers’ welfare is then the total social welfare. Hence, the NIE
increases the total welfare too.
8Table 2: Consumption and prices of three main dairy products in China (1998-2008)
a
Year
Level (kilogram per capita) Price (Chinese Yuan per kilogram)
Liquid milk Yogurt Milk powder Liquid milk Yogurt Milk Powder
1997 5.07 0.44 2.87
1998 6.18 0.64 3.01
1999 7.88 0.87 3.08
2000 9.94 1.12 3.43 Not available
2001 11.90 1.36 3.50
2002 15.68 1.82 3.85
2003 18.62 2.52 3.92
2004 18.83 2.85 3.57 4.58 6.11 37.18
2005 17.92 3.23 3.64 4.41 6.32 43.73
2006 18.32 3.72 3.50 4.71 6.45 48.08
2007 17.75 3.97 3.15 5.19 6.34 55.60
2008 15.19 3.54 3.99 6.55 7.35 74.95
a Source: China Milk Yearbook (2006-2009) and China Dairy Statistical Report (2009).
ket accounted for more than 90% of the market. The milk powder market, where infant formula
takes more than half of the market share, is highly concentrated as the top ﬁve companies ac-
count for approximately 2/3 of the market share and they are all international companies. Among
the top ten companies, only two companies, Yili and Sanlu, were domestic companies and their
market share were relatively small (4.40% and 2.25%). Fierce competition exists in Chinas dairy
industry between domestic and foreign companies, between large and small-scale companies, as
well as among companies in different regions. Small and medium sized domestic dairy compa-
nies compete with large companies by establishing and focusing their business mainly in the local
and regional markets (Dairy Industry of China 2003, P27). Foreign investment and multinational
dairy companies have either established or expanded their business in China. Synutra International
Inc. (hereafter Synutra), which is mainly based in Hong Kong, Netherlands, the United States and
China, operates subsidiaries under name Synutra and/or Shengyuan in China (Annual Report of
Synutra, 2009). American Dairy Inc. (hereafter American Dairy) operates through its fully owned
subsidiary called Feihe Dairy in Heilongjiang Province. Merger and acquisition are also used by
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Figure 2: Per capita consumption among urban households by income groups
tional corporation and ranked 48 in the Fortune 500 in 2009, bought Yunnan Dengchuan Diequan
as its rehearsal to enter China dairy market (Dairy Industry of China 2003, P28). The American
Longdi International Company established Shenyang Huishan that was ranked the 9th in the China
liquid milk market in 2006. Among various marketing strategies that dairy ﬁrms employ to im-
prove their product reputation and competitiveness, one important strategy is to secure a NIE title.
As shown in Table 1, a total of 101 dairy ﬁrms were awarded the NIE title from 2000 to 2007.
Third, the2008Chinamilkscandal, involvedmilkandinfantformulaadulteratedwithmelamine,
generated a great deal of buzz in China and overseas. On September 11th, 2008, Sanlu issued a
product recall and made a public corporation apology, which put the scandal in the central stage of
the national and even global attention on food safety. Based on the AQSIQ product tests for milk
powder on September 16th, products of 22 out of 109 companies were found to be contaminated
with melamine, including Yili, Bright, Mengniu, and Synutra. On September 18th the AQSIQ con-
ducted tests for liquid milk products of 411 companies. Except Mengniu, Yili and Bright, liquid
milk produced by all the other 408 companies such as Sanyuan and Nestle were not found to be
contaminated. The relative less contamination in liquid milk is largely attributed to the fact that it






























































































Figure 3: Market shares of top ten dairy companies of three main dairy products, 2006
is technically more difﬁcult and economically more costly to add melamine to liquid milk than to
milk powder. Among 22 infant formula producers were found to be contaminated with melamine,
eight ﬁrms hold the NIE title during the course of the scandal.
4.2 Data
We use both ﬁrm-level data provided by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and survey
data collected after the 2008 milk scandal. The ﬁrm-level dataset includes all up-scale industrial
ﬁrms in China, including all state-owned industrial ﬁrms and non-state owned industrial ﬁrms with
annual sales revenue over 5 million Chinese Yuan (approximately US$770,000). Based on the
NBSC’s data, we generate an unbalanced panel data set of the dairy ﬁrms in 1998-2007. The
industry data consists of 1189 domestic dairy companies whose main products are milk powder,
liquid milk and/or yogurt. As shown in Table 3, until 2002 the dairy ﬁrms did not have the effective
NIE title; and less than 8% out of a total of 5011 ﬁrm-year observations hold the NIE title (N=394).
11Compared with their counterparts, the NIE titled ﬁrms are more likely among top ten brands and
have less share of state-owned ownership but more share of collectively owned and foreign owner-
ship. Companies with the NIE title also have signiﬁcant higher sale revenue, advertising costs and
R&D investment adjusted by total number of employees.
Table 3: Summary statistics of relevant ﬁrm-level information
Year Non-NIE NIE Total Year Non-NIE NIE Total
1998 318 0 318 2003 508 21 529
1999 319 0 319 2004 581 37 618
2000 323 0 323 2005 572 63 635
2001 373 0 373 2006 528 120 648
2002 424 21 445 2007 523 129 652
Total number of ﬁrms-year observations (1998-2007) 4,617 394 5,011
Among the 5011 ﬁrm-year Non-NIE NIE Total
observations mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
Main product = Milk powder (%) 43.12 56.35 44.16
Main product = Liquid milk (%) 52.03 43.40 51.35
Main product = Yogurt (%) 3.23 0.00 2.97
Main product = Other (%) 1.61 0.25 1.52
Top Ten brands (%) 8.87 44.47 11.74
Export (%) 3.50 3.86 3.53
Age (year) 12.67 (13.76) 10.11 (9.26) 12.47 (13.48)
State-owned (%)∗ 19.81 (37.58) 5.25 (17.87) 18.65 (36.60)
Collectively owned (%) 38.16 (44.91) 59.37 (45.20) 39.87 (45.30)
Private (%) 35.11 (44.89) 20.21 (37.32) 33.92 (44.51)
Foreign (%) 6.98 (22.77) 15.16 (33.71) 7.63 (23.93)
Sales revenue per employee (million)) 0.33 (0.62) 0.68 (0.73) 0.36 (0.64)
Ad. cost per employee (million) 0.01 (0.04) 0.03 (0.10) 0.01 (0.05)
R&D investment per employee (million) 0.07 (0.60) 0.37 (2.30) 0.09 (0.87)
*. ﬁrm has its unique ownership structure consisting of different types of ownership.
Following the media buzz of the 2008 milk scandal, we conducted a face-to-face survey among
mothers with infants and young children in Shenyang during the ﬁrst ten days of October, 2008.
Shenyang, the capital city of Liaoning Province located in northeastern, is one of the biggest cities
in China hosting more than eight million population. A total of 1,228 mothers completed the sur-
vey. The data consist of mothers brand choice of baby formula after the scandal, monthly expenses
12and consumption of baby formula, as well as their socio-demographic information. During the
survey, we told each respondent that liquid milk of some NIE titled dairy companies were found
to be contaminated with melamine.
These two data sets allow us to investigate the impact of the NIE title on ﬁrm performance and
consumer perception without and with severe concerns and uncertainty of food safety.
4.3 The Impact of the NIE title on Sales Revenue
Annual sale revenue per employee (ASRE) is highly skewed as suggested by its skewness coefﬁ-
cients, 2.89 and 11.28 for companies with and without the NIE title, respectively. Thus, the tradi-
tional student t test for equal mean is not appropriate as the test is highly sensitive to the normality
assumption. We conduct the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests [Wilcoxon,
1954, Mann and Whitney, 1947]. Since the test statistic of the WMW test, χ2(1) = 268.35, ex-
ceeds the critical value of 6.63 at the 1% signiﬁcance level, we conclude that the average ASRE
among the ﬁrms with the NIE title is statistically higher than those without the NIE title. However,
the difference in ASRE between ﬁrms with and without the NIE title can be attributed to other
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. We continue with regression analyses to further explore the potential positive
impact of the NIE title on sales revenue.
4.3.1 Difference-in-Difference Models
We estimate the impact of the newly received NIE title on ﬁrm performance in the ﬁrst award year
using the different-in-difference (D-in-D) approach. We generate a working data set for the D-in-D
models based on the industry data set. For each year starting from 2001 when the NIE system was
launched, we include all the ﬁrms who received the NIE title the ﬁrst time but also presented in the
previous year without the NIE title in the treatment groups, but other ﬁrms that did not receive the
NIE title in both years are classiﬁed into the control group. Let S(1) be the treatment group and
S(0) be the control group; and t = 0 for the ﬁrst period and t = 1 for the second period; and y be
the outcome (sales revenue per employee). We write the sales revenue per employee below:
Yit = γ0 +  t + θS(1) + δS(1)t + ǫit. (5)
The difference-in-difference estimate is
ˆ δ =
 




ˆ YS(0),t=1 − ˆ YS(0),t=0
 
. (6)
We estimate two models, Model 1 including main and interactive terms of the period dummy and
the group dummy, while Model 2 also incorporate the cohort dummy indicating the year that each
13ﬁrm received their NIE title (the 2001 cohort is used as a base). Based on the estimation results in
Table 4, compared with ﬁrms in the control group, ﬁrms received the NIE title in the second period
(the treatment group) are associated with a statistically signiﬁcant, higher increase in the sales
revenue in the ﬁrst award year (the second year). The sale revenues difference between two periods
for the NIE ﬁrm is approximately RBM1,600 (exp(ˆ δ) = exp(0.482) = RMB1.619 million higher
than those in the control group for Model 1 and exp(ˆ δ) = exp(0.464) = RMB1.590 million for
Model 2 of the D-in-D estimates).
Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Estimation Results
Dependent varable = ln(sales revenue per employee) Model 1 Model 2
t = 1 0.131∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040)
treatment group ((S(1)) 0.376∗ 0.271
(0.202) (0.203)
















Standard errors in parentheses; and ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
144.3.2 Panel Analyses
Even though the change in ﬁrm characteristics for the same ﬁrm is insigniﬁcant, the characteristics
are likely to change over time. To take the beneﬁt of the panel data set to run panel estimations.
We Assume ASRE is a Cobb-Douglass function of ﬁrm attributes and the NIE title,
ASREit = e
α0+α1NIEit+βFit+ i+ǫit, (7)
where F is a vector of ﬁrm attributes that are observable to researchers and β is a vector of coefﬁ-
cients associated with these ﬁrm attributes;  i captures the effects of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
istics; and ǫit is error terms. Taking logarithm of Equation (7), we have
ln(ASREit) = α0 + α1NIEit + βFit +  i + ǫit. (8)
We include the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics: age in years; type of the main products
(milk powder, liquid milk, yogurt, and others); ownership structure represented by the share of
state-owned, collectively owned, private and foreign ownership; whether a ﬁrm produces one of
the top ten dairy brands; whether a ﬁrm export their products; advertising costs per employee; and
R&D investment per employee. Since the literature has well documented that sales revenue has a
positive impact on the level of R&D investment [David et al., 2000], we use R&D investment per
employee in the previous year to avoid endeogeneity. We also take logarithm of ﬁrm age, shares
of different ownership types, advertising cost, and R&D investment and, therefore, the coefﬁcient
of these variables are interpreted as elasticity.
We estimate three panel models depending whether advertising costs and R&D investment are
included. For each model, Since the Hausman tests favor the random-effects models over the
ﬁxed-effects models for each mode, we then report the estimation results of the random-effects
models in Table 5. The estimation results are very similar between three models. Ceteris paribus,
a NIE title has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive impact on ASRE. Despite the size difference of
the coefﬁcient of the NIE title between the models, the difference of ASRE between a ﬁrm with
and without the NIE title is similar between the models – ranging from approximately RMB1,279
(exp0.246 = RMB1,279 million) in Model 3 and RMB1,553 (exp0.440 = RMB1,553 million)
in Model 2. The additional sales that the NIE title can boosts is economic signiﬁcant given the
average sales revenue per employee is approximately RMB362. Table 5 also suggests that a one
percent increase in the advertising cost per employee increases ASRE by 0.017% in Model 2,
ceteris paribus. As shown in Table 3, the average sales revenue and advertising cost per employee
are RMB360 and RMB12.96, respectively. Let assume two identical ﬁrms have the average ASRE
and the average advertising cost per employee. Firm A received a NIE title and ﬁrm B incurs
15advertising cost to promote sales. Firm B has to spend approximately RMB3.246 million (1.553 ∗
12.96/(0.017∗360) = RMB3.246 million) to have the same ASRE as ﬁrm A. Therefore, the NIE
title is more cost effective than advertising for these two similar ﬁrms.
4.4 Consumer Perception of the NIE Title when Facing a food scare event
The analyses above using the industry data suggests that the NIE title boosts sales revenue, which
suggest that consumers are responsive to the NIE title. However, their perception of the NIE title
may change the NIE ﬁrms are involved in food scare events. We use the survey data of 1,228
mothers in Shengyang to explore the impact of the NIE title on brand choice among consumers.
Random utility theory states that indirect utility function for individual i choosing alternative
brand j is
Uij = δXij + ǫij, (9)
where X is a vector representing brand attributes and individual characteristics, δ is a vector of
coefﬁcients to be estimated, and ǫ is the error term or random component that captures unobserved
factors that may affect brand choice. In particular, we include the ﬁxed-effect and average price of
different brands, an indicator for the NIE title, monthly household income, and interactive terms
between income or education and the NIE and import dummies. As shown in Table 6, consumers
are more likely to choose an infant formula with the NIE title. The preference for the NIE title
is signiﬁcantly associated mother’s education, but not with the household income. On the other
hand, consumers are less likely to buy the imported brands, but a highly educated or low income
individual will prefer the imported brands. The unexpected negative, statistically signiﬁcant effect
of the imported brands on brand choice may due to the fact that the imported brands in general are
more expensive than domestic brands – the price difference is approximately RMB30 per kilogram
based on the 11-city retail prices of infant formula. Based on the coefﬁcients of the NIE dummy
and prices, the estimated average price premium for the NIE brands is approximately RMB8.98
per kilogram (0.63/70.79 ∗ 1000 = 8.89).
We also estimate the nested logit models. Ideally, we want to estimated a three-level nested
logit model – individuals decided whether to buy the imported or domestic brand, whether to buy
formula with and without the NIE title, and which brand to buy. However, STATA does not allow
us to include the same independent variables in the different nest levels. We then ﬁt the data into
the nest logit model sequentially. First, we estimate whether individuals choose the imported or
domestic brands and the consequent brand choice decision. Second, we estimate the NIE choice
and the consequent brand choice given the decision on buying the imported or domestic brand is
16Table 5: Panel Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
NIE title 0.423∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.042)
log of ﬁrm age 0.191∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.049) (0.051) (0.042)
log(share of different types of ownership): base = state-owned
collectively owned 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
privately owned 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
foreign 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Top Ten brands 0.673∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.141) (0.119)
Liquid Milk relative to milk powder 0.037 0.046 0.153
(0.096) (0.097) (0.108)
Yogurt relative to milk powder -0.159 -0.158 -0.216
(0.232) (0.234) (0.387)
Dummy for export 0.142∗ 0.147∗ 0.043
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Financial indicators: Debt-to-Asset ratio -0.050 -0.044 -0.000
(0.040) (0.041) (0.022)
Capital-to-Asset ratio -0.006 -0.002 -0.034
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Log(Advertsing cost per employee) 0.017∗∗ 0.003
(0.008) (0.005)
Lag of log(R&D investment per employee) 0.031∗∗∗
(0.004)
Constant -1.877∗∗∗ -1.795∗∗∗ -1.464∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.249) (0.242)
No. of observations 4664 4663 3492
within R2 0.035 0.042 0.015
between R2 0.117 0.107 0.163
overall R2 0.116 0.111 0.158
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 17made. The test statistic of the LR tests for the IIA (irrelevant independence of alternatives) property
in each nested logit model exceeds the critical values (see Table 6. Thus, we concluded that the
IIA property may not be satisﬁed and, the nested logit model performs better than the conditional
logit model.
The results of the nested logit models are reported in Table 6. Individuals with a high income
and/or highly educated are more likely to prefer the imported brands over the domestic brands,
which is the same as that in the conditional logit model. Once the decision on the imported vs.
domesticbrandsismade, respondentsaremorelikelytochoosetheNIEbrands. Onceanindividual
decided to buy the imported brands, income and education does not play a statistically signiﬁcant
role in the NIE choice. However, highly educated mothers prefer the NIE brands if they decide
to buy the domestic brands. Thus, the results seem to implies that despite of the severe food
scare events involving the NIE ﬁrms, consumers still prefer the NIE brands over non-NIE brands,
especially among highly educated mothers.
5. Conclusions
This study uses both the secondary ﬁrm-level data and the survey data to explore the impact of the
NIE title on ﬁrm performance and consumer brand choice. We ﬁnd that the NIE title boosts sales
revenues and its impact is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, consumers
prefer the NIE brands over the non-NIE brands, especially among highly educated consumers and
thosewhobuydomesticbrands. SuchpreferencepresentseveniftheNIEcompanieswereinvolved
with food safety events.
Since eight of 22 dairy companies involved with the 2008 milk scandal held an effective NIE
title, the NIE system has been widely criticized and the credibility of AQSIQ has been severely
ruined. As a result, AQSIQ annulled the NIE system in the food sector. However, the question
is whether it is socially optimal to take such a radical action. One possible reason for a strong
preference for the NIE brands among consumers can be lack of quality information and consumers
rely on the NIE title for quality assessment as the awarded ﬁrms have to meet certain quality
standards. The question next is whether it is possible to make signiﬁcant changes of the NIE
system such that the NIE title can serve as a good quality signal rather than simply annulling the
system. One possibility is to conduct random quality inspection during the term of the effective
NIE title in addition to the annual quality report to the local AQSIQ ofﬁce. Such unexpected visit
may give ﬁrms incentives to maintain their quality level at least as high as the legal standard. The
other measure is to charge a signiﬁcant amount of penalty if substandard is caught during the NIE
title, which deter the deviation of the quality under the legal standard.










given import = 1 given import = 0
NIE brands† NIE brands†




price -70.79∗∗∗ -14.97∗ 3.76 -213.74
(13.7) (7.67) (8.01) (3113.80)
monthly HH income 0.71∗∗∗ 0.05 0.04
(RMB1,000) 0.06 (0.06) (0.19)
Mother’s education 1.86∗∗∗ 0.40 0.44∗∗
(college and above) (0.23) (0.43) (0.19)
NIE*income 0.05
(0.05) * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
NIE*edu 0.42∗∗ Figures in parentheses are standard deviations







LR tests for IIA: χ2(2) = 421.15 χ2(2) = 108.34 χ2(2) = 6.19
One limitation of this study is that we are not able to quantify the change in consumer pref-
erence for the NIE brands before and after the 2008 milk scandal as we only conduct the survey
post-event. One possibility is to extend the industry data till the end of 2008 with the permis-
sion from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, which allows us to investigate the change in
the NIE effect on ﬁrm performance (sales revenue) before and after the scandal. Another direction
could be the analysis using the store level data of infant formula purchase in the pre- and post-event
periods. Furthermore, we expect the impact of the NIE title is more signiﬁcant and/or greater in
an industry where the quality of products are more difﬁcult to observe or at a high cost to observe
19than in other industries. Instead of using the industry data of one particular product category, we
use the industry data of different sectors to compare the effect of the NIE title between different
industries.
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